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Abstract
This paper analyses low income dynamics in Britain using the first four waves of the British
Household Panel Survey. There is much low income turnover: although there is a small group of
people who are persistently poor, more striking is the relatively large number of low income
escapers and entrants from one year to the next. Simulations using estimated low income exit and
re-entry rates demonstrate the importance of repeated low income spells for explaining a person’s
experience of low income over a given period. We also document the characteristics of low
income stayers, escapers and entrants.
JEL classification: D31, I32.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we analyse the dynamics of low income in 1990s Britain using data
from the first four waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS).
1 Our
research provides a longitudinal complement to the Department of Social
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1Jarvis and Jenkins (1995), Taylor et al. (1994) and Webb (1995) examined income dynamics using only two
waves of BHPS data. Department of Social Security (1996) — which appeared after the more detailed version of
this paper (Jarvis and Jenkins, 1996) — also used four waves of BHPS income data, but with different definitions
and analyses. Most other UK research has largely focused on specific income components rather than the more
comprehensive measure of personal living standards, income itself. Earnings dynamics are analysed by, for
example, Dickens (1996) and Ball and Marland (1996), and welfare benefit dynamics by, for example, Shaw et al.
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Security’s Households Below Average Income (HBAI) reports which are largely
based on cross-section data.
We document the size of the ‘persistent poverty’ problem and amount of low
income turnover. Low income exit and re-entry rates are also calculated. In
addition, we describe the characteristics of the people who were persistently poor,
those making transitions out of low income and those making transitions into low
income. For the latter two groups, we also investigate how these income changes
are related to changes in household employment and demographic composition
over the same period. All the patterns we describe are robust to the choice between
two definitions of what the low income cut-off is.
We show that there is much turnover in the low income population. Although
there is a small group of people who are persistently poor, it is the relatively large
number of low income escapers and low income entrants from one year to the next
that is more striking. Almost one-third of our sample experienced low income at
least once during the four-year period. Simulations using estimated income exit
and re-entry rates demonstrate the importance of repeated low income spells
(rather than single spells) for explaining how often people experience low income
over a given time period. Thus low income churning is a significant phenomenon
in 1990s Britain.
Employment-related events such as getting a job are found to be associated
with making transitions out of low income. For transitions into low income, job
loss together with demographic events changing household composition are
important. The group with low income at all four interviews mostly comprises
single pensioners and families with children headed by a couple or lone parent not
in work.
II. DATA AND DEFINITIONS
Our research is based on data from Waves 1 to 4 of the BHPS. The first wave was
designed as a nationally representative sample of the population of Great Britain
living in private households in 1991. Households comprising the first wave
(interviews in Autumn 1991) were selected by an equal probability sampling
mechanism using a design standard for British household social surveys. The
achieved sample comprises about 5,500 households, which corresponds to a
response rate of about 65 per cent of effective sample size. At Wave 1, over 90
per cent of eligible adults (approximately 10,000 individuals) provided full
interviews. Original sample respondents have been followed and reinterviewed at
approximately one-year intervals subsequently. The wave-on-wave response rate
was about 88 per cent for Wave 1 to Wave 2, and over 90 per cent thereafter.
2
                                                                                                                             
2For a detailed discussion of BHPS methodology, representativeness, and weighting and imputation procedures, see
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We work with the subsample of 7,910 persons (adults and children) present in
each of the four waves and who belong to complete respondent households. The
first restriction arose from the desire to examine income sequences over all four
waves; the second yields the sample for whom we can derive our preferred income
measure.
3 In order to account for differential non-response at Wave 1, and
subsequent differential attrition, all statistics presented below are based on data
weighted using the BHPS Wave 4 longitudinal enumerated individual weights.
Our income measure, net income, has the same definition as the Department of
Social Security’s HBAI ‘before-housing-costs’ one (see, for example, Department
of Social Security (1995)). In short, net income is the sum across all household
members of cash income from all sources (income from employment and self-
employment, investments and savings, private and occupational pensions, and
other market income, plus cash social security and social assistance receipts)
minus direct taxes (income tax, employee National Insurance contributions, local
taxes such as the community charge and the council tax), with the result deflated
using the relevant McClements equivalence scale rate in order to account for
differences in household size and composition (Department of Social Security,
1995). In order to compare real incomes, all incomes have been converted to
January 1995 prices. The unit of analysis is the person: following standard
practice, each person is attributed the net income of the household to which he or
she belongs. The income receipt period is the month prior to the wave interview or
most recent relevant period for each income component (except for employment
earnings, which refer to ‘usual earnings’).
4 We have converted all sums to a
consistent pounds-per-week basis. Because our income observations for each
person refer to their incomes round about the time of an interview (that is, some
time during the last quarters of 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1994 for most respondents),
we do not take account of the additional movements out of and into low income
occurring outside the periods round the interview.
We side-step the vexed issue of what the appropriate definition of ‘low income’
is, by using in parallel two definitions of the low income cut-off:
• half Wave 1 mean income (a threshold that is fixed in real income terms); and
• the poorest quintile in each wave (a threshold that varies in real income terms).
                                                                                                                             
3For some analyses, this criterion may impart some selection biases that are not fully offset by the use of the BHPS
weights. (We return to this issue later in the paper.) We hope to develop methods for imputing income values for the
remainder of the BHPS sample.
4The derivation of the net income distributions requires much manipulation of the raw BHPS data. For detailed
discussion of variable construction, and a demonstration of the validity of the derived distributions relative to a
range of relevant HBAI bench-marks for Waves 1 and 2, see Jarvis and Jenkins (1995). The council tax
imputations are explained by Redmond (1996). Our derived variables have been deposited with the Data Archive at
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The real income value of the first cut-off is some £127 per week for all four
waves; the real income values of the second are £135, £139, £140 and £144 for
Waves 1–4 respectively. Half mean Wave 1 income corresponds to the 18th
percentile of the Wave 1 distribution, but only the 14th percentile by Wave 4.
There are empirical and conceptual advantages to using these two definitions in
parallel. From a conceptual point of view, the dual usage strikes a balance
between those who argue for a fixed real income cut-off, often on the grounds that
the incidence of low income should necessarily decline as real income grows, and
those who argue for a threshold that depends on the income distribution in
question. Using the poorest quintile is an example of the latter approach (an
alternative would be some fraction of the contemporary mean). From an empirical
point of view, using the two thresholds allows sensitivity analysis of the
conclusions drawn to variations in the generosity of the threshold: the quintile-
based cut-off is higher than the absolute threshold (by some 6 per cent at Wave 1
and about 13 per cent at Wave 4). The particular levels of the chosen thresholds
are, of course, somewhat arbitrary, as there is no clear-cut evidence of a sharp
increase in poverty or deprivation at these specific values. However, half-the-
average and quantile cut-offs do have the virtue of being commonly used in British
empirical research on incomes; in particular, closely-related definitions are used in
the DSS’s HBAI statistics.
5 Finally, the cut-offs provide a sufficiently large
number of cases in the low income stayer, escaper and entrant sub-groups to allow
meaningful breakdowns by subsample characteristics.
III. LOW INCOME DYNAMICS
1. The Extent of Persistent Poverty
Table 1 summarises the (Wave 1)(Wave 2)(Wave 3)(Wave 4) income sequence
patterns for our longitudinal sample, where an income has been recoded as L (low)
if it is below the low income cut-off for that year and H otherwise. The left-hand
side of the table shows the results for the case when the low income cut-off is half
Wave 1 mean income; the right-hand side shows the case when it is the poorest
quintile. For both cases, the table shows the relative incidence of each of the
relevant sequences.
                                                                                                                             
5Another reference point is social assistance benefit levels. These have remained fairly constant in real terms over
this period and our half-1991-mean-income cut-off is more generous than the entitlements for many people. For
example, in October 1991, a childless married couple with no income of their own were eligible for income support
of £62.25 per week, plus housing benefit covering housing costs. If housing costs were £25 per week, total social
assistance entitlement would be £87.25. In equivalent net income terms (converted using the McClements
equivalence scale and reflated to January 1995 prices), this is a figure of about £94 per week. People with social
assistance entitlements near to our half-Wave-1-mean cut-off (£127 per week) would be those with above-average
housing costs.Low Income Dynamics
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The first row of Table 1 helps address the issue of how widespread the
persistent poverty problem is. We find that 4.3 per cent of the sample had an
income below half Wave 1 mean income at all four interviews (those with LLLL,
row 1). This proportion is about 70 times larger than the proportion one would
expect to find were the chances of having low income at each interview
statistically independent (0.06 per cent). If instead the low income cut-off is the
poorest quintile, the proportion persistently poor rises to 7 per cent, which is about
44 times larger than the proportion were there statistical independence (0.16 per
cent). To put things another way, we find that of the group of people with incomes
below half Wave 1 mean income, 52 per cent still had low income when
interviewed at Wave 2. About one-third (34 per cent) of the original Wave 1 low
income group had low income at Waves 1–3, and about one-quarter had low
income at all four waves.
TABLE 1
Low Income Sequence Patterns for Two Low Income Cut-Offs
Low income cut-off =
half Wave 1 mean
Low income cut-off =
poorest sample quintile




1. LLLL 4.3 4.3 7.0 7.0
2. LLLH 1.8 6.0 1.9 8.9
3. LLHL 1.2 7.2 1.2 10.1
4. LLHH 2.2 9.4 2.2 12.2
5. LHLL 1.2 10.6 1.4 13.6
6. LHLH 1.2 11.8 1.0 14.6
7. LHHL 0.7 12.5 1.2 15.8
8. LHHH 5.5 17.9 4.2 20.0
9. HLLL 1.4 19.3 2.5 22.5
10. HLLH 1.5 20.8 1.5 24.0
11. HLHL 0.9 21.6 0.9 24.9
12. HLHH 2.6 24.3 2.9 27.8
13. HHLL 1.8 26.0 2.2 30.0
14. HHLH 2.2 28.3 2.6 32.6
15. HHHL 3.0 31.3 3.6 36.2
16. HHHH 68.7 100.0 63.9 100.0
All 100.0 100.0
Base n 7,910 7,910
Notes: The table summarises the income sequences (Wave 1 income)(Wave 2 income)(Wave 3 income)(Wave 4
income), with incomes recoded L if below the low income cut-off and H if equal to the cut-off or higher.
Percentages calculated using BHPS longitudinal weights.Fiscal Studies
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Whether these figures indicate that the incidence of persistent poverty is
relatively high or not is difficult to judge, and likely to depend on whether or not
one believes the cut-offs are meaningful in terms of individual deprivation. None
the less, we are struck by the sensitivity of the estimate of the proportion
persistently poor to changing the low income cut-off. Although the quintile cut-
offs are only some 6 to 13 per cent higher than half Wave 1 income, the
‘percentage poor for four waves’ score is about 60 per cent higher in the latter
case. The lesson is that estimates of the incidence of persistent poverty can be
sensitive to choice of low income threshold, especially if the thresholds are located
in a relatively crowded section of the income range, as in our case.
International comparisons provide another yardstick for judging whether our
estimates of persistent poverty are large or small. Duncan et al. (1993) report
estimates for six countries in Europe and North America of the percentage of
families with children with incomes below 50 per cent of median size-adjusted
income in all three years of a three-year period during the mid-1980s. For
Germany and the Lorraine region of France, the percentages were about 1.5 per
cent, and for Luxemburg and the Netherlands, they were 0.4 per cent. They were
much higher in Canada (11.9 per cent) and the US (14.4 per cent). Using estimates
of the composition of the persistently poor population (presented later), we
estimate that about 7 per cent of persons in couple or lone-parent families with
children at Wave 1 had an income below half the Wave 1 mean at three
consecutive interviews. Since half the mean is a more generous cut-off than half
the median (£127 compared with £109 at Wave 1), the 7 per cent should be
adjusted further downwards to be comparable with Duncan et al.’s estimates. But
even if this adjustment halved the proportion, the British estimate of persistent
poverty amongst families with children would be larger than the European ones
cited above. Drawing firmer cross-national conclusions requires closer attention to
be given to the comparability of the income definitions and more up-to-date data.
There may have been changes in persistent poverty rates between the mid-1980s
and the 1990s.
2. How Many People Experience Low Income over a Period of Time versus at a
Point in Time?
Although, on either definition of the low income cut-off, a minority of the
population had low income at every wave, many more had low income at one
period or another. If we focus on the figures for the half-Wave-1-mean cut-off, we
find that 5.6 per cent had low income at three interviews, 8.1 per cent had low
income at two interviews (15.3 per cent had two or more consecutive Ls) and 13.1
per cent had low income at one interview in four. These statistics imply that during
the four-year period, 9.8 per cent of the sample had at least three low income
spells, 17.9 per cent of the sample had at least two low income spells and 31.3 per
cent of the sample had at least one low income spell. In other words, almost a thirdLow Income Dynamics
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of the sample is touched by low income at least once over a four-year period (that
is, about twice the proportion with low income at one interview, which was 18 per
cent at Wave 1 and 15 per cent at Wave 4).
If the poorest quintiles are the low income cut-offs, the proportion touched by
low income at least once is just over a third at 35 per cent, which is 175 per cent
larger than the 20 per cent proportion for a single wave.
We are struck by the extent of low income turnover; so too are audiences to
whom we have presented this research. The turnover is another manifestation of
the Jarvis and Jenkins (1996) finding that there is much year-to-year income
mobility for all income groups, albeit mostly short-range. It should also be
remembered that our figures underestimate the proportion touched by low income
throughout the four-year period. Recall that low income spells other than round
about the time of the panel interviews are not examined here.
IV. LOW INCOME EXIT AND RE-ENTRY RATES
With four waves of the BHPS, we can begin to look at how low income exit rates
vary with the length of time people have had a low income, and at how low income
re-entry rates vary with the length of time people have been out of low income.
These rates can be used to predict the length of time that people will spend in low
income during a single continuous low income spell, and the number of times they
experience low income over a given number of years. The exit and re-entry rates
that are relevant in this context are the ones that refer to the experience of a cohort
of persons starting a low income spell (and thence at risk of exit thereafter) and to
the experience of persons finishing a low income spell (and thence at risk of re-
entry thereafter). The exit rates are not in general the same as the exit rates from
the stock of low income persons at a particular time: the stock contains a mixture
of recent entrants and long-term stayers. An analogous argument applies to the re-
entry rates.
To estimate exit rates, we use data for cohorts of persons beginning a low
income spell in the second or third wave (those with sequences HLxx and xHLx in
Table 1); to estimate re-entry rates, we use data for cohorts of persons finishing a
low income spell in the first or second wave (those with sequences LHxx and
xLHx). Low income exit rates were calculated by dividing the number of persons
ending a low income spell after d waves with low income by the total number with
low income for at least d waves. Low income re-entry rates were calculated
analogously. Our analysis is constrained by the small number of waves of data
currently available: we can only estimate two exit and two re-entry rates.
1. Low Income Exit and Re-Entry Rate Estimates
The low income exit and re-entry rate estimates, for the two sets of low income
cut-offs, are displayed in Table 2. Also shown are the proportions of personsFiscal Studies
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remaining on low income, or who re-enter low income, broken down by duration,
corresponding to these estimates.
We find, using the half-Wave-1-mean cut-off, that the exit rate from low
income after one year with low income is 0.54. The exit rate after two interviews
reporting low income falls slightly, to 0.51. The results imply that, for a cohort
starting a low income spell, just under one-half (46 per cent) still have low income
after one year, and about one-fifth (22 per cent) still have low income after two
years (that is, after the third interview reporting low income). That is, almost four-
fifths of the low income entry cohort no longer have low income after two years.
The low income re-entry rate one year out of low income (that is, at the second
interview) is 0.29, but after two years (at the third interview), the re-entry rate
more than halves, to 0.11. The rates imply that, for a cohort of persons starting a
spell out of low income, 29 per cent will start another low income spell after one
year, and more than one-third (36 per cent) will have fallen below the threshold
again after two years. Thus nearly two-thirds of the cohort will have incomes
above the cut-off for at least two years (three interviews).
When the low income cut-off is the poorest quintile, we find different
magnitudes but similar patterns. The main difference is that exit rates are slightly
lower, and re-entry rates higher, which is not surprising since the real income
levels characterising the low income thresholds are slightly higher. A higher
crossbar is harder to jump over than a lower one, and easier to fall below. Another
difference between the results for the different thresholds is that the low income
exit and re-entry probabilities do not decline as quickly in the poorest-quintile cut-
off case, again probably reflecting the crossbar effect. The differences in rates for
TABLE 2















Low income cut-off = half Wave 1 mean income
1 0.54 100 0.29 0
2 0.51 46 0.11 29
3 22 36
Low income cut-off = poorest quintile
1 0.50 100 0.30 0
2 0.38 50 0.23 30
3 32 47
Notes: Exit rates derived using data for persons beginning a low income spell in the second or third wave (sequences
HLxx and xHLx in Table 1). Re-entry rates derived using data for persons finishing a low income spell in the first
or second wave (sequences LHxx and xLHx in Table 1).Low Income Dynamics
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the different low income cut-offs have quite large implications. For the quintile
thresholds, the proportion starting a low income spell still with low income after
two further years is about one-third (rather than one-fifth), and the proportion of
low income escapers starting a new low income spell after two years is nearly one-
half (rather than just over one-third).
Our estimated probabilities of exit and of re-entry are higher than those found
by Shaw et al. (1996) in their study of income support (IS) receipt during 1991–
92. Their life-table estimates show that the proportion of a cohort starting an IS
spell still claiming after one year is about 60 per cent, and that about one-half are
still claiming two years after the spell starts (Shaw et al., 1996, ch. 10). The
proportion of former IS claimants who start another claim after one year of
finishing the previous spell is estimated to be about 25 per cent. The results are
consistent with our results for low income, since IS entitlement levels are less
generous than the thresholds we are using — the crossbar is lower still (see
footnote 5).
Our results can also be compared with estimates of US poverty exit and entry
rates for 1971–81 made by Bane and Ellwood (1986) and for 1970–87 by Huff
Stevens (1994 and 1995) using Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data.
Bane and Ellwood’s classic study reported that the probability of exit from
poverty after one year was 0.45, and after two years 0.29 (1986, Table 6), and
Huff Stevens reports almost identical figures when eliminating some one-year
poverty spells as Bane and Ellwood did. When these adjustments are not made,
Huff Stevens estimates the poverty exit rate after one year to be 0.53, and after
two years to be 0.36. She also reports poverty re-entry rates of 0.27 after one year
out of poverty, and 0.16 after two years out of poverty (1995, Table 1). We are
struck by the fact — differences between the US and British welfare states and
between the periods covered aside — that our estimates are not too far out of line
with Huff Stevens’s ones.
It is important to take the exit and re-entry probability results together. The
exit rates, if looked at on their own, might suggest that the majority of people
falling into low income will spend only a couple of years in this situation.
However, the path out of low income is not a one-way up-escalator: the re-entry
estimates remind us that there is a not insignificant chance of finding oneself on
the down-escalator to low income again within two years. This implies that low
income spell repetition is an important phenomenon in Britain, and needs to be
taken into account alongside the issue of single long-term low income spells.
2. Accounting for Multiple Spells is Important for Predicting the Number of Low
Income Interviews over a Given Period
These remarks are emphasised by the results of a simulation exercise, comparing
single-spell and multiple-spell predictions of the number of interviews at which
people will have low income during a fixed period, with the actual number. TheFiscal Studies
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methodology follows that used by Huff Stevens (1995, Table 2), though we have
data for a much shorter period than she does (three years rather than 10) and, as a
consequence, our sample sizes are much smaller (hundreds rather than thousands).
The single- and multiple-spell predictions have been derived using the exit and re-
entry rates shown in Table 1, and the actual distribution of ‘number of interviews
with low income out of next three’ is derived using data for all persons comprising
the low income entry cohort at Wave 2 (those with an income sequence HLxx in
Table 1).
6
The results are summarised in Table 3. The single-spell distribution estimates
(first column) suggest that about one-half of those starting a low income spell will
have low income for only one year, and this fraction is much higher than actually
occurred (last column) or was predicted by the multiple-spell distribution
estimates (second column). These results underline our point that repeated low
income spells are an important feature of poverty dynamics in Britain.
Comparisons of the multiple-spell distribution estimates with the observed
distributions provide a guide as to how well simple life-table models predict
observed distributions of the number of years with low income over a given period
(more precisely, the number of interviews out of three with a low income). As it
happens, they do fairly well, in the sense that the estimates are not too far apart.
None the less, it appears that the simulations underpredict the fraction
                                                                                                                             
6Our thanks to Carol Propper for suggesting this exercise. The formulae used to generate the estimates are given in
Jarvis and Jenkins (1996).
TABLE 3
Distribution of ‘Number of Interviews with Low Income Out of Next Three’:





Distribution of ‘number of interviews with
low income out of next three’
Predicted Actual
Low income cut-off = half Wave 1 mean income
1 0.54 0.38 0.42
2 0.24 0.38 0.36
3 0.22
a 0.23 0.22
Low income cut-off = poorest quintile
1 0.50 0.35 0.37
2 0.19 0.34 0.31
3 0.31
a 0.31 0.32
aThree or more interviews.
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 derived from Table 2 exit and re-entry rates. Column 3 derived from Wave 2 low income
entry cohort (sequences HLxx in Table 1).Low Income Dynamics
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experiencing low income at only one interview out of three, and overpredict the
fraction experiencing low income at two interviews.
These results are consistent with Huff Stevens’s (1994 and 1995) finding (for
the US) that taking account of repeat spells provides much better predictions than
does relying on single-spell estimates. She also reports that the former
underpredict very short poverty spells. As Huff Stevens goes on to demonstrate,
better predictions of the time spent in poverty over a given period require
substitution of the simple life-table methods with poverty exit and re-entry models
that allow rates to differ between people with different levels of education, age and
other characteristics. Application of these more sophisticated modelling methods
to British poverty dynamics will become more feasible as the number of waves of
BHPS data increases.
V. WHO ARE THE PERSISTENTLY POOR?
From a policy perspective, it is important to be able to distinguish the causes of
long- and short-term poverty in order to tailor anti-poverty policy measures
accordingly. Is long-term low income systematically associated with having some
particular set of characteristics, or are the persistently poor simply a random
subset of those who are poor at a particular point in time? If the latter case
obtains, then there is no particular reason to develop a policy programme specially
directed at long-term poverty alleviation separate from the ‘standard’ anti-poverty
measures for the point-in-time poor population (Duncan, Coe and Hill, 1984).
We begin to address these issues here by looking at the characteristics of low
income stayers, defined as those persons having low income at all four interviews.
We compare breakdowns by sex, family type and family economic status for this
group with the corresponding breakdowns of all the people who had low income at
Wave 1: see Table 4. We shall discuss the results based on using half Wave 1
mean income as the low income cut-off, as the results for the other threshold
definition are very similar (see Jarvis and Jenkins (1996) for details).
The Characteristics of Low Income Stayers
We find that, although many of the same types of people who are low income
stayers are the same as those who comprise the Wave 1 low income population,Fiscal Studies
134
there are some marked differences in the breakdowns. The Wave 1 low income
population mostly comprises elderly persons (single adults and married couples)
and non-working families with children (married couple and lone-parent families),
and each of these sub-groups is over-represented relative to their numbers in the
Wave 1 sample as a whole (compare last two columns of Table 4). In contrast, the
TABLE 4
Characteristics of Low Income Stayers,
by Person Type, Family Type and Family Economic Status
(low income cut-off = half Wave 1 mean income)





Wave 1 Wave 4
Person type
Male adult 20 22 27 36
Female adult 45 46 46 42
Dependent child 35 32 28 22
Family type
Single pensioner 24 27 21 11
Couple pensioner 7 7 12 10
Couple and child(ren) 35 37 34 40
Couple, no children 4 2 8 21
Single and child(ren) 26 19 17 7
Single, no children 5 7 8 13
Family economic status
1+ adults full-time self-employed 5 6 5 11
All adults employed full-time 0 0 2 24
Couple: 1 full-time, 1 part-time 0 0 2 14
Couple: 1 full-time, 1 not in work 3 7 8 13
Single or couple: 1+ part-time work 10 4 11 7
Head or spouse aged 60+ 33 36 36 19
Head or spouse unemployed 25 22 18 5
Other (lone parent, disabled, etc.) 23 23 17 6
All 100 100 100 100
Base n 321 321 1,386 7,910
Notes: Low income defined as having income less than half Wave 1 average income. Low income stayers are those
with low income at all four waves (income sequence LLLL in Table 1). ‘Low income at Wave 1’ column refers to
all persons with low income at Wave 1. ‘All at Wave 1’ column refers to all longitudinal sample members at Wave
1. Family type and family economic status definitions as in HBAI reports (Department of Social Security, 1995).
Percentages calculated using BHPS longitudinal weights.Low Income Dynamics
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breakdowns of the Wave 1 characteristics of the low income stayer group reveal
that elderly persons and non-working families with children are heavily
represented amongst this group too, but in a different mix from the Wave 1 low
income population. In particular, there are noticeably more people belonging to
lone-parent families (26 per cent compared with 17 per cent) or to couple families
with children in which neither the head nor the spouse is working (25 per cent
compared with 18 per cent). As a result, there are more dependent children
amongst the low income stayers than amongst the Wave 1 low income group (35
per cent compared with 28 per cent). There are also more single pensioners (24
per cent compared with 21 per cent).
There are both similarities and differences between our findings and those of
Duncan et al. (1984) based on US PSID data for 1969–78. The results are similar
because we also find that the persistently poor differ from the short-term poor.
However, the differences we find are not as marked as theirs, though this may
simply reflect the different definitions and observation period (for example, they
define persistently poor as eight or more years poor out of 10, and discuss the
1970s rather than the 1990s). Like us, Duncan et al. find an over-representation of
families headed by a woman.
Table 4 also breaks down the low income stayer population according to their
characteristics in Wave 4, and interestingly the distribution across sub-group
categories is broadly similar to the Wave 1 one. Not everyone remains in the same
sub-group though. Over time, people’s household contexts change: people marry,
divorce, have children, get jobs, lose jobs, children leave home, etc. We calculate,
for example, that 18 per cent of the sample experienced a family type change
between Wave 1 and Wave 4, and 32 per cent experienced a change in their
family’s economic status. These results do not lead us to change our conclusions
about which sort of people are most likely to be persistently poor, since the Wave
4 breakdowns are much the same as the Wave 1 ones. However, we are struck by
how much family context change was experienced even within the low income
stayer group, whose incomes did not fluctuate significantly over the period (by
definition). We look at the relationship between economic and demographic flux
and income changes in the next section.
VI. WHO MOVES OUT OF LOW INCOME? WHO MOVES IN?
We now turn from considering the characteristics of the low income stayers to
seek to identify those who escape from low income and those who enter it. We
examine the characteristics and events associated with making a transition out of
low income or making a transition into low income. Bane and Ellwood’s (1986)
study of US poverty spells during the period 1970–82 is the pioneering example of
such research. In common with all such studies, we had to consider the issue of
how to identify ‘genuine’ transitions separately from those simply representing
measurement error or random year-to-year fluctuations. Following Duncan et al.Fiscal Studies
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(1993), we defined a low income escaper to be someone with an income below the
low income cut-off at Wave t and an income at least 10 per cent higher than the
low income cut-off at Wave t+1, where t = 1, 2, 3. Similarly, a low income entrant
has an income above the low income cut-off at Wave t and an income at least 10
per cent lower than the low income cut-off at Wave t+1. We then pooled all the
transitions and examined the characteristics and events of those experiencing
them.
7 Between one in six and one in seven of the sample made a transition out of
low income over the four waves, and a similar fraction made a transition into low
income: see Table 5.
In seeking to document the factors associated with transitions into and out of
low income, our analysis has two dimensions. First, we describe those making
transitions between Waves t and t+1 in terms of their characteristics at Wave t.
Second, we examine the associations between low income exit and entry and
contemporaneous economic and demographic changes in a person’s family
environment. More precisely, we compare the incidence, amongst those who
escape or enter low income between Waves t and t+1, of various events occurring
between Waves t and t+1, with the incidence amongst the sample as a whole. The
events considered are changes in family type, number of adults and number of
children in the household, family economic status, and number of earners in the
household. Results are broadly the same whichever low income cut-off definition
is used, and so we refer below to results for the low income cut-off of half Wave 1
mean income (see Jarvis and Jenkins (1996) for the full set of results).
1. The Characteristics of Low Income Escapers and Entrants
Table 5 displays the breakdowns by age at Wave 1, pre-transition person type,
family type and family economic status. By definition, low income escapers are
drawn from amongst the low income population, and entrants from amongst the
non-poor, and so it is of interest to know how the characteristics of the mover and
at-risk groups match up — are the movers a random selection of those at risk?
Table 5 reveals that escapers are predominantly elderly people or belong to non-
working families with children, i.e. precisely the same groups most commonly
found amongst the low income group as a whole (compare with the ‘Low income
at Wave 1’ column). However, some interesting differences stand out: note
amongst the escapers the higher proportions of childless couples (and adults aged
40–54 years at Wave 1) and childless single adults (and adults aged less than 30
years). We have checked whether these two groups were disproportionately
located close to the low income cut-off in the first place, and it does not appear
that this is in fact the case, suggesting the results do not arise simply because
childless people required smaller income changes to escape low
                                                                                                                             
7By construction, each person contributes a maximum of one transition out of low income and a maximum of one




Characteristics of Low Income Escapers and Entrants
at the Wave prior to the Transition












Age (at Wave 1 interview)
Dependent child 24 30 28 22
Adult aged <30 years 16 18 14 18
30–39 10 13 10 15
40–54 12 11 8 18
55+ 37 29 40 28
Person type
Male adult 34 32 27 36
Female adult 45 42 46 42
Dependent child 21 26 28 22
Family type
Single pensioner 19 14 21 11
Couple pensioner 9 6 12 10
Couple and child(ren) 32 37 34 40
Couple, no children 12 13 8 21
Single and child(ren) 11 14 17 7
Single, no children 16 16 8 13
Family economic status
1+ adults full-time self-employed 7 15 5 11
All adults employed full-time 2 9 2 24
Couple: 1 full-time, 1 part-time 3 7 2 14
Couple: 1 full-time, 1 not in work 9 9 8 13
Single or couple: 1+ part-time work 11 12 11 7
Head or spouse aged 60+ 33 21 36 19
Head or spouse unemployed 17 11 18 5
Other (lone parent, disabled, etc.) 18 16 17 6
All 100 100 100 100
(As a percentage of total
longitudinal sample)
(15) (12) (18) (100)
Base n 1,132 897 1,386 7,910
Notes: A low income escaper has an income below the low income cut-off at Wave t and an income at least 10 per
cent higher than the low income cut-off at Wave t+1. A low income entrant has an income above the low income
cut-off at Wave t and an income at least 10 per cent lower than the low income cut-off at Wave t+1. ‘Low income atFiscal Studies
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Wave 1’ column refers to all persons with low income at Wave 1. ‘All at Wave 1’ column refers to all longitudinal
sample members at Wave 1. Transitions pooled from t = 1, 2, 3.
income.
8 And remember that these childless groups form a minority of the escapers
in any case.
When we look at the characteristics of the low income entrants, we find that
their profile is similar to that of the escapers. In other words, the entrants group is
mainly comprised of elderly people (about a fifth are from pensioner families) or
people from families with children (about one-third are couple families, about one-
seventh lone-parent families). Compared with the distribution for the sample as a
whole at Wave 1, there are disproportionately more unemployed or part-time
couple and lone-parent families (and hence dependent children) and single
pensioners. In part, this is because these groups are more likely to have incomes
relatively close to the income cut-off, and have less far to ‘fall’ — this comment
applies particularly to single pensioners and unemployed and part-time couple
families.
9
2. Economic and Demographic Events associated with Low Income Exits and
Entries
We now investigate the association between changes in people’s household
context and changes in income, comparing the incidence of events amongst low
income escapers and entrants with those of the sample as a whole — see Table 6.
We find that family economic status changed for about one-third of escapers
and for more than 40 per cent of entrants, which is much higher than the incidence
amongst the sample as a whole of about one-quarter. The incidence of pure family
type changes is less than the incidence of family economic status changes for all
groups, but this is to be expected since changes in one’s family economic status
can come about via family type changes.
10 Looking at family type changes, there is
above-average incidence for entrants (14 per cent) but, interestingly, not for
escapers (about one-tenth). There is a similar pattern in the relative incidence of
joint changes in family economic status and family type. They were experienced
                                                                                                                             
8We compared the composition of the group with incomes between the cut-off and 10 per cent less with the
composition of the group with lower incomes. If any group amongst the escapers is notably disproportionately close
to the cut-off, it is the elderly.
9We compared the composition of the group with incomes between the cut-off and 10 per cent above it with the
composition of the group with higher incomes.
10We should stress that our economic status variable refers to an individual’s family context. Changes in this may
occur even if the individual in question has not changed his or her own work pattern. They may also arise via
changes in work status for other family members, or by a change in family composition. (An example would be a
married couple family at Wave t with the husband working full-time and the wife part-time. If the woman is a lone
parent at Wave t+1 but still working part-time, her family economic status, according to our definition, will have
changed.) The emphasis on family (or household) context is entirely appropriate because we are interested in
household income.Low Income Dynamics
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by 6 per cent or fewer of the total sample and of low income escapers, but by
about one-tenth of the entrants.
11
TABLE 6
Percentages Experiencing Economic and Demographic Events:
Low Income Escapers and Entrants compared with Whole Sample
(low income cut-off = half Wave 1 mean income)







Family economic status changed 26 23 23 32 43
Family type changed 11 7 8 11 14
Both economic status
and type changed
6 4 2 6 10
No. of earners in household:
decreased 13 13 12 15 30
unchanged 75 76 77 67 56
increased 12 11 11 18 14
No. of adults in household:
decreased 7 7 5 6 14
unchanged 82 88 87 85 79
increased 11 5 8 9 7
No. of dependent children in
household:
decreased 10 3 6 4 8
unchanged 86 93 90 91 85
increased 4 4 5 4 6
Note: Low income escapers and entrants defined as in Table 5.
The lower panels of Table 6, focusing on changes in the numbers of earners,
adults and children in a person’s household, provide greater detail and reveal some
clear patterns. Looking at the changes in the number of earners first, we find that
increases in the numbers of earners in the household are associated with transitions
out of low income, whereas decreases in the number are associated with transitions
                                                                                                                             
11The decline in the incidence of economic status and family type changes between Waves 1–2 and Waves 3–4 may
arise for several reasons. One is that it may reflect a sample selection bias: we are working with a longitudinal
sample from complete respondent households, and one might expect that economic and demographic change —
especially the latter (for example, divorce and separation) — is more common amongst households with incomplete
responses, and that this effect will cumulate over time. That part of the impact of complete non-response (that is,
panel attrition) that is not fully accounted for by the longitudinal sample weights we use would have a similar effect.
The trend might also be genuine: there was a general recovery in the British economy after 1991, and with this may
have come greater stability in family context.Fiscal Studies
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into low income. The number of earners increased for 18 per cent of escapers
compared with 11 to 12 per cent of the sample as a whole. For entrants, the
contrast with the sample as a whole is even more distinct: the proportion with a
decrease in the number of earners is more than twice the average sample incidence
— 30 per cent compared with 12 to 13 per cent.
There are also some interesting associations between household composition
change and low income status change. Escapers appear to experience about
average, or slightly above-average, demographic stability: the fraction of the group
with the same number of adults is much the same as for the whole sample, the
fraction with the same number of dependent children is a little larger than for the
total sample, and there are slightly lower fractions experiencing either increases or
decreases in numbers. There is a more distinctive picture for entrants. In
particular, the number of adults in the household decreased for 14 per cent of this
group, twice the fraction for the whole sample. Entrants also experienced
(slightly)-above-average changes in the numbers of children in the household.
In sum, escapers appear to have above-average incidence of increases in the
numbers of earners, combined with roughly average changes in the number of
adults and number of children. Increases in the numbers of earners may arise
either through an existing household member getting a job or by the arrival of a
new partner who also works, or both. Since the incidence of household
composition change is about average for this group, this suggests that getting a job
plays a particularly important role in taking people out of low income. Stability in
household composition may also have a benign influence. This story fits best for
the escapers who are in non-working families with children. For others, such as
pensioners, it is less relevant. For this sub-group, it may simply be that transitory
income fluctuations are much more important. These may be due to measurement
errors rather than genuine transitory fluctuations (expected to be less important,
given the nature of most pensioners’ income packages).
Our results about the correlates of transitions out of and into low income are
not directly comparable with those of Bane and Ellwood (1986) for the US and
Duncan et al.’s (1993) cross-national study because we have not used such a
detailed (and mutually exclusive) list of named economic and demographic events
as they did.
12 However, Duncan et al. conclude that employment-related events
were the most important events associated with transitions both into and out of
poverty for their samples of families with children, and this finding is consistent
with the ones we report above for this group. Both Duncan et al. and Bane and
Ellwood also draw attention to the impact of demographic events (for example,
marriage/remarriage and divorce/separation) and report that such events were
                                                                                                                             
12This is the subject of current work. However, for some more detailed breakdowns of Table 6, by pre-transition
family type and economic status, see Jarvis and Jenkins (1996). Jarvis and Jenkins (1997) provide detailed
evidence about the income changes associated with marital splits.Low Income Dynamics
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more important for entries to poverty than exits. This appears to be the case in our
analysis as well.
VII. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
This paper has provided new evidence about low income dynamics using a large
sample of British households interviewed annually during the early 1990s. From
one year to the next, there are significant numbers of both low income escapers
and low income entrants. Over time, there is significant churning in the low
income population, and this is highlighted by our simulations of low income
experience over a period based on the low income exit and re-entry rate estimates.
The results have implications for both welfare benefit and labour market
policies. The large amount of low income turnover means that the welfare benefit
system has an important role providing short-term support: over a year, many
more people are helped by the benefit system than would be revealed by focusing
on the benefit caseload at a point in time (which disproportionately comprises
long-term stayers). Longer-term help from the benefit system is also important of
course, particularly for poor people beyond retirement age. Single pensioners form
about one-quarter of the persistently poor group but they have limited
opportunities to improve their incomes through paid work or marrying someone
with sufficient income. These opportunities, especially the former, are of course
more relevant to those of working age. However, although we have shown that
getting a job is associated with escaping low income, it should be remembered that
we examined associations with short-term income changes. If the job gained were
of only short duration, then the low income escape is also likely to be only
temporary (as the turnover and spell repetition results remind us). Policies for
permanent escapes need to increase the tenure and quality of labour market
attachment.
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